I'm currently studying European Political Economy at the
European Institute of the London School of Economics. My current research focuses on
comparative welfare state development in Central and Southeastern Europe and monetary policy formation in transition or
semi-independent authority regimes. For LSE people, I've included course references and links to presentation notes.
My dissertation
Download a draft research proposal here.
Is there a distinct transition model of public health provision? Central and Eastern European governments
tend to overspend on health by up to 3% of GDP compared with OECD averages. My empirical work shows
a strongly negative relationship between transition government size and the share of health expenditure undertaken
by the government. Simultaneously confronted with EU budgetary restrictions and massive public uncertainty with the reform process,
Central and Eastern Europe governments have devoted scarce resources to fund benefits though with great hesitance.
My research evaluates the balance between the economic motives for government intervention in the health care market
and the diametric political demands of national constituencies: a demand for both wider secure social safety nets
and a greater reliance on market allocation on the heels of the Communist experience.
I compare the cases of Poland (an advanced reformer with significant progress in terms of health program efficacy slated for EU membership
in 2004) and Croatia (a less-advanced transition economy far more reliant on World Bank assistance than EU conditionality) to
assess how these countries were able to balance these conflicting demands.
Some recent papers
Pension reform: the policies EC429 Reform of Economic Systems, LT 2003
Pressures for pension reform stem primarily from (a) a weak connection between contributions and benefits
in the old system [a micro incentive to evade and disincentive to save] and (b) concern about the fiscal sustainability of
government expenditure on pensions [the macro]. Three divergent reform paths emerge: (a) reform the extant system (Czech Republic,
Slovenija), (b) shift to a fully-funded private system (Chile, Kazakhstan), or (c) introduce a hybrid, multi-pillar system (Poland,
Hungary, Romania). Notes
How do we explain the apparent predominance of exit over voice as social responses to the hardships of systemic change in CEE?
EU400 Political Economy of Transition in Europe, LT 2003
Despite fears that the hardships associated with post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe could precipitate
upheaval with the potential to derail reforms, citizens have responded to hardship overwhelmingly with apparent patience rather
than protest. To account for widespread withdrawal from post-Communist political life, I employ Hirschman's conception of exit
and voice as transmission mechanisms of dissatisfaction from consumers back to suppliers. Extrapolating Hirschman's framework to
the political sphere, I will consider why we might expect voice responses and propose a classification of transition social
responses based on their degree of re-enforcement and longevity. I then propose two paradigms to account for the predominance of
individual exit responses despite falling economic and health standards and dissatisfaction with the short-term costs of economic
reforms: (1) a rational expectations view that stresses the relative expected payoff from voice relative to the known costs of exit
and (2) a cultural and historical view that emphasizes the legacy of socialism and fatalism over the course of economic reforms.
While cultural and historical arguments may explain a general proclivity towards particular forms of social response, a rational
calculus of costs and benefits helps to explain why despite a history of socialism and broad elite consensus about the direction
of reforms protests have in fact occurred in the region. Full text Notes
Explaining the persistence of coordinated wage bargaining in Europe EU443 Models of Capitalism, LT 2003
Neo-corporatist and convergence literature anticipates the gradual reduction of coordinated bargaining
systems as the growing pressures of international competition fuel a steady march towards market deregulation. Yet in practice,
since 1980 coordinated wage bargaining has persisted in many European countries and in some, even increased. In this essay, I
consider the longevity of coordinated wage bargaining systems (rathan than their initial development) through two
paradigms: (1) coordinated bargaining systems have flexibly adapted to competitiveness considerations and (2) the inter-locking
institutional arrangements of coordinated market economies tends to re-enforce the extant system over time. Full text
Is stabilization really important, or is it just an obsession of the IMF? EU400
Political Economy of Transition in Europe, LT 2003
One can hardly overstate the deleterious ramifications of high inflation and low output
growth for the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe struggling to maintain public
support for market transformation. Rather than debating the absolute importance of stabilization
policy, economists and policy-makers have cleaved into two groups based on the relative importance
of stabilization in the larger context of transition economic policy. This paper weighs the social
insurance stabilization offers against the collective uncertainty of transition against its
instrumental role in promoting longer-term micro restructuring and the conduct of effective
government. Full text Notes
Extending structural funds to candidate countries: merits of the Berlin 2000 negotiations EU443
Political Economy of EU Enlargement, MT 2002
Adopted originally to promote harmonious and balanced development in the disparate regions of
the European Union, structural funds have ballooned into a divisive obstacle to enlargement into
the ten accession countries of Central and Eastern Europe. While a purist economic interpretation
of the program would cite cohesion and regional development as requisite for a common monetary
policy, a political economist would have to consider the highly political nature of fund allocation
as evidence that structural funds offset the costs of EU membership more than they promote
infrastructure development in the poorest reaches of the EU. This paper categorizes arguments for and
against extending structural fund access to new EU member states in 2004. Full text
Notes
Paradoxically, the opposition to EU enlargement within the EU may be easier to overcome than within the accession countries EU443
Political Economy of EU Enlargement, MT 2002.
EU enlargement is not without its enemies. Despite arguments of universal gains to consumers,
opposition both within the current EU-15 and the prospective AC-10 may still derail the process.
In political economy terms, though enlargement promises diffuse benefits from increased mobility
of factors of production, the disconnect between the diffuse gains to consumers and the highly
concentrated costs to key producers engenders opposition from special interest groups likely to
suffer in a larger European Union. This paper considers EU exclusive policy instruments to placate
opposition, mobilization of consumer support groups on the EU level, and momentum in support that
favors EU-15 states giving in to support enlargement. Full text
Major papers from Georgetown
Health infrastructure determinants of
World Bank foreign aid: Empirical evidence from sub-Saharan
Africa, 1991-2001. April 2002.
A recent surge of criticism of the allocation and effectiveness of World
Bank development assistance programs has threatened to
precipitate a major reworking of multilateral foreign aid policy.
Though recent research has shown that aggregate aid flows respond
primarily to political measures of openness and stability,
health-specific International Development Agency loans
overwhelmingly favor recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa
with strong pre-existing health infrastructure, higher income,
and previous World Bank commitment in the country. This paper
considers the motives underlying the allocation of IDA health
development assistance in 47 sub-Saharan African countries from
1991-2001. Based on empirical findings that the considered aid
disbursements respond robustly to non-political factors, the
World Bank chooses to allocate health aid where it can be used
more effectively for public health development a necessary
intermediary step of the World Banks larger mission of
poverty alleviation. If through investment in countries where
health aid can be used most effectively the World Bank is able to
show that health infrastructure investment improves poverty
levels, multilateral donors can expropriate ineffectual aid to
health projects in developing countries that currently exhibit
sub-standard levels of health infrastructure development.
Full text
Convergence in European Union eastward enlargment: Empirical analysis of the relative
strength of the Polish application. Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, April 2002.
The highly emotional and highly political process of European Union enlargement negotiations with
Poland potentially overlooks the underlying economic content of
the prospective members application for membership. This
paper uses the institutional premise of convergence as requisite
for EU-level policy development and implementation to evaluate
relative success and failure of EU applicant countries to gain
entry into the European Union based on the Copenhagen Criteria
democratic development, market development, and ability to
adopt the European code of law. Though a thorough empirical
analysis of the salient negotiating points requires consideration
of all applicants, this paper will access the implications of key
negotiating factors specifically for Poland. Full text
Please email me any questions or comments.
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